# ‘Is it a good land or a bad one?’

## Transcription of a Shiur by **Avivah Zornberg** in memory of **Joy Rochwarger Balsam** *z"l*

When the family asked me to give the shiur tonight, I knew it was going to be difficult, I didn’t know how difficult it was going to be. I feel our hearts and minds are full of Joy, and what I want to do now, in a way, is talk about something else. I want to talk about the parsha, I want to talk about the spies; and in a sense it’s going to be like moving away from one thing to another. I know it’s hard to do, however, I feel that Torah is never about something else; in other words Torah is always about what is concerning one. And when I thought through what I want to say about the parsha, it seemed to be full of references of things that were relevant to Joy.

What I want to talk about mostly is love. And I want to talk about love of Eretz Yisrael, love of G-d, love. And Joy was full of love. Not only was she full of love, but she was someone who struggled to be full of love. She worked very hard on being what she thought was a rightly loving person. I’d like to give a shiur, which is a shiur on Parshat HaShavua, without specific reference to Joy, and at the end to say one word, one more word, about Joy.

And so we move into the story of the spies, the story of the meraglim, Parshat Shlach. And immediately the question arises about spying, about things that can be seen, and things that can’t be seen. The mission of the spies is to go ‘lirot et ha’aretz’, to go and see the land. ‘מה היא what is it?, הטובה היא אם רעה is it good or bad? One of the questions that the spies are sent to answer, one of Moshe’s questions, he formulates the question – is it good or is it bad? It all depends on an act of seeing.

There are many times that the word to see is used after that. The spies see. One of the things they are very definite about seeing is the giants. They say it three times. We saw the giants, we saw the giants, we saw the giants. Three different words for giant. That obviously made a very serious impact on them. There are references to the things that the people had seen in the desert. They had seen Hashem ‘ayin be’ayin,’ eye to eye. They had seen how Hashem had carried them through the desert. Their experiences are called experiences of vision, of seeing. They bring back fruit, and they show fruit, a visual experience for the people. And in the end Hashem says, these people, these spies shall not see the land, because of what went wrong with this whole story, they shall not see the land. Even though that was their original agenda. They were sent to see the land.

Apparently the word to see can mean many things. It seems to be one of those very simple words that has to do with using your eyes empirically to witness, to register some kind of objective truth.. And, as you know, it has many other meanings. Did you see Venus this week? I hope you didn’t see Venus. That is, I hope saw Venus in such a way as not to see Venus, not to allow Venus to destroy you, to destroy your eyes. Someone on television said, it isn’t what you see, it is how you imagine it. You watch that spot crossing the sun. What makes you so excited is how you are reconstructing what that really is. What you are actually seeing is very little. Not

enough to make you excited. It is what your imagination is doing, it's what your associations are doing; a sense of values, a sense of what you believe and know about what you are seeing. All that feeds into the experience of seeing to make it a subjective matter, rather than an objective matter.

We have, of course, two stories of the meraglim. One is in our Parsha, and one is when Moshe tells the story all over again, at the end of the forty years, when finally people are ready to enter Eretz Yisrael. In our Parsha what we have is the catastrophe. And this is **the** catastrophe. The catastrophe which means the whole mission of Yetziat mitzrayim, in a sense, is stopped. The whole idea has been to go towards Eretz Yisrael, and as soon as they arrive at Eretz Yisrael they jam; they are not going to be able to move further. And what happens after that, as you know, is that the whole adult generation dies and only the next generation, after forty years, gets to go to Eretz Yisrael.

That original idea of sending spies, whose idea was it? In our Parsha it is clearly Hashem who says "shlach lecha anashim". In that sense there is nothing wrong with the original idea. The original idea of sending spies is a perfectly respectable project – it comes from G-d Himself.

In Sefer Devarim Moshe tells the story very differently. He says "ותקרבון אלי כולכם" you, all of you, came against me, in a kind of menacing group, and you said " ונשלחה אנשים לפנינו" let us send people in front of us to – and a different word for spying is used - לחפור – to excavate and to bring back word. To bring back word – it's a question of a fact-finding mission, which sounds rather legitimate, to find out what the roads are like, what the cities are like to prepare for war.

What really happened? Was it G-d's idea or was it the people's idea? Two different stories. Rashi comments on the word 'לך' - שלח לך : by use of his midrashic translation (he is quoting Bamidbar Rabba and the Gemara in Sota), he undermines the idea that this was a command altogether. That is, this was not a divine command, because of the word לך. What does לך mean here? לדעתך, אין אני מצוה אותך, אם תרצה שלח. Three times over Rashi says, It's really up to you. לך means it's up to you, I'm not commanding you. Contrary to what you thought at first, שלח is not the imperative form. G-d is saying you can do it if you want to do it, I am not commanding you. And Rashi says this three times over. That is making it very clear that apparently Hashem has serious reservations about this project, but he is not going to stop the people from sending the meraglim, if that is what they want to do.

Now it is a question of tone. How does one read this? Do we hear this in a tone of G-d being seriously offended, angry. The kind of tone that says, 'Well, if you want to do it, then go ahead and do it, but I am not behind it; it's up to you now to decide.' If you look at what Rashi says afterwards perhaps it helps to understand the tone, it helps to understand the nature of the moment. Rashi goes on to tell the story, now harmonizing the two narratives. The beginning of the story is as Moshe will tell it. Bnei Yisrael had already come and said, Let us send people in front of us to explore the land. And Rashi refers to the story in Sefer Devarim. Moshe then consulted with G-d, and G-d answered, I told them it's a good land. 'אמרתי להם שהיא טובה' - Why do they need to find out if it is a good land or not? In other words, according to Rashi, there is already, at the beginning of the whole project, a sense that G-d is offended at

the need of the people to find out something that he had explicitly told them. He had told Moshe at the sneh, right at the beginning of the story, I'm taking them out of the misery of Mitzraim, אל ארץ טובה ורחבה, that sounds like an objective description, why don't they believe Me. Straight from the word of G-d to Moshe, why don't they believe Me. חייהם שאני נותן להם מקום לטעות. But instead of stopping them, Hashem says, 'As they live, I will give them space for error. I will give them maneuvering room to make mistakes. Again, is that said in angry tone of 'Well, I'm going to let them make their own mistakes', or is it said in a tone of 'There's no possibility of stopping them trying to find out for themselves about this particular question'?

This particular question of 'Is it a good land?' – there's no way of enforcing that. There's no way of enforcing the idea that people should go into a land about whose goodness they are dubious. The only way they are going to go is if they actually find out for themselves. They are no longer children, they are approaching a certain maturity, a number of the commentaries stress this, so they are going to have to find out for themselves. And if they make mistakes, then they are going to have to live with their mistakes, and they are going to have to deal with it, and perhaps they will grow as a result. Perhaps that is the tone?

What I would like to suggest is that that little word לך already introduces us into the theme that I would like to develop over the course of our evening together, and that is, how difficult it is to know what anything means. Even a little word like לך in the Torah. Start with the minimum. You would think that we all know what the word לך means. There's a very famous לך – לך לך, and there's a very famous translation there by Rashi. What does לך mean there? לטובתך ולהנאתך -It will be for your good and for your benefit. Well, I would like to be able to tell myself, now I know what the word לך means; now I have a code for the word לך. Wherever I find the word לך after a verb, I know that it means for your good, for your benefit.

And then I come to שלח לך, and I find that the same Rashi, without apology, says no, here it means almost the opposite. Here it means something not for your good, but if you insist on sending, then send – which is a very different translation of the word לך. Apparently starting with the shortest word in the language there is a problem of knowing for sure what anything means. What it means depends on context, on tone, on a certain tradition. Many factors enter into how we know the meaning of anything, starting with this very brief example.

What I would like to do this evening is move in widening circles, out from that very small example, of how difficult it is to know what anything means. Starting with a word, going on to understanding the narratives of the Torah; the relationship between tragedy and human behavior, between crime and punishment, sin and punishment. And in the end the largest question of what we call צדיק ורע לו – the righteous person who has a fate that is inexplicable in moral terms. How can one understand that? What's the meaning of that? That's my agenda for the evening, and I apologize that it is rather a large agenda, and I'm going to try and be as succinct as possible.

I have a few points that I would like to make. According to Rashi, it seems that Hashem finds that the heart of the problem of sending the meraglim is the question of it being a good land. That is what Rashi has made very clear. Not the other questions that Moshe will ask the people, the spies, to find out, but Is it a good land or a bad

land? – that is the heart of the story. And the spies fail on that, that is what Rashi is basically saying. If so, then there are a number of serious problems. First of all, it is not the spies and it is not the people, who formulate that problem. The people don't ask 'Is it a good land or is it a bad land?' The spies don't ask that. Who asks it? Moshe. It is Moshe who asks the question, Is it a good land or a bad land? So why is Hashem angry with the people as a whole for being concerned about that question when he already told Moshe that it is a good land? They didn't think of the question themselves. It is Moshe who put the question into the minds of the spies. How do we understand that? Secondly, and just as importantly, when the spies come back they give the right answer. They come back and say ארץ זבת חלב ודבש – it's a land flowing with milk and honey, which is a direct quotation from what Hashem said to Moshe at the Sneh. And they also bring the fruit – they bring the fruit to demonstrate – Look how good it is. In other words here's empirical proof of what we've seen, that it is a perfectly good land, a wonderful land. And in the story in Sefer Devarim the spies actually use the word ,טובה they say 'it's good,' in Moshe's retelling of the story. So we're falling between the stools here: it's Moshe who thought of the question, and it's the spies who brought back the impeccable answer. So what's the problem? Where do the spies fall down? Where did the people fall down? These are strong questions.

If we move now to the Rashi that you can see in number two. Rashi relates to Moshe's original response to the project. He carries on the story that he is telling us after forty years. He says וייטב בעיני הדבר– I liked the idea. When you came and asked to send spies, I liked the idea, I thought it was a fine idea, and the word he uses is טוב, again good. I thought it was a good idea. Rashi's comment: בעיני ולא בעיני המקום – here are eyes already – we're talking about eyes and seeing. It was **in my eyes** a good idea, but not in the eyes of G-d. Again it's a question of how you read the text. You can say in English, 'I *liked* the idea' and you can say '*I* liked the idea'. You can emphasise the I and then you are saying, from my perspective it looked like a good idea. But I was wrong, because there are other perspectives, and it turns out that G-d had different ideas about it, and He didn't like it. And so you are emphasizing your personal perspective, which sounds arrogant but in fact is more modest. It is more modest to emphasize your personal perspective because what you are saying is 'This is what I think, and I know there are other people around, with other ways of looking at things, but I am telling you honestly what I thought, but I was wrong.'

Then what Rashi does is really extraordinarily profound: quoting the midrash, he goes on to object, If Moshe thought it was a good idea, then why is he including it in the tochacha, in these early stories in Sefer Devarim about all the sins of the people? He is also incriminated in that case. If he agreed with the idea, then he is also included, he can't rebukethe people. And without comment, Rashi brings a mashal. The mashal is a very suggestive parable about someone who wants to sell a donkey. A wants to sell B let's call it a used car, and B says 'Can I take it for a test drive?', and A says, 'Yes, sure'. And B says 'Up mountains and down valleys? I really want to give it a good test'. And A says 'Yes, sure', and B persists, 'I need to take it down to Eilat', and A says 'Yes, sure'. What is the seller hoping will happen? You listen to this transaction and if you are innocent about human transactions, about what the words really mean, you think it's pshat, you think it's exactly what you hear. Anyone who has the slightest experience about human transactions will know it's about nuances and tone, and understands that the seller is hoping that by showing complete

confidence in his car, and by showing that he is perfectly willing to allow the car to be tested every way, he is hoping to lull the buyer into confidence, into a sense of trust so that he won't in the end have go on all the test runs. That is, that language will actually serve instead of the act.

Moshe is hoping that if he expresses perfect confidence in the land, that it is a good land – 'Yes, you can test it, you can send the spies' – (he is acting as if he likes the idea. I think that is how Rashi is translating here: I acted **as if** I liked the idea of sending spies) he was hoping that that would do it. 'If I showed such confidence, I was hoping you wouldn't insist on actually sending the spies - but לא חזרתם בכם. And I failed'. This was a kind of poker game, where one's intentions are hidden. Moshe is too confident that he understands the mind of his people. He can play a game that will determine the results that he wants. And apparently there's something going on in the minds of the people that he has no access to. He doesn't understand how seriously they are anxious about this question of 'Is it a good land?' There's a kind of anxiety there that can't be lulled by such tactics, and the people insist on sending the spies.

Now this mashal, example, that Rashi brings, I think is by way of telling us again something about the complexity of the uses to which language is put. That you have to look not only at what the language says, but at what the language does. That's the famous distinction made by the philosopher, J L Austin. Look at any language in any context, look at what it's doing, at what it's trying to achieve, and for that you have to know many things. You have to bring in imagination, you have to bring experience. You have to bring many things to understand the pshat. What is really going on here? This is not just an innocent transaction. The seller is trying to achieve something; he either manages or he doesn't. Moshe is somewhat too confident that he will manage to convince the people of his absolute trust in the value, in the goodness of the land. What gives Moshe this confidence?

If we have a glance at Ramban. Ramban in general goes in a different direction, (number 1b). Ramban thinks there is nothing wrong in the project of sending spies, you are going to be engaged in war, it's a strategic preparation for war, it's nothing to do with faith or lack of faith. And he then adds this point, which I find to be extremely important and poignant. He says it could be, in addition, that Moshe was so confident of the fertile good land because G-d had told him. He was the navi, he was the prophet to whom G-d had spoken. So he had heard it from G-d himself that it's a good land. So the word 'good' for him, the word טובה for him has come from the mouth of G-d. In fact he is so confident that he in fact invents the question, Is it a good land or a bad land? And in fact he directs the spies to look at the land: If you only look you will see how good it is. In other words, for Moshe it is an absolutely empirical matter. The goodness of the land is like a multiple choice question – Is it good or is it bad? There can be only one right answer. If you only will look at it. And he is extremely enthusiastic about sending the spies, according to Ramban, directing them to notice it. Don't miss it, I want you to pay attention, so that you will come back with the unequivocal answer that it is a good land.

And Moshe has no doubt that that has to be the answer, how could it be anything else. In addition, the people's morale will be raised and they will be able to enter Eretz Yisrael, not dragging their feet, but with a real sense of optimism and joy, because of

the report that they will undoubtedly receive from the meraglim. Now that is the absolute confidence that leads Moshe to ask the question like that, Is it a good land or a bad land? What went wrong that in fact that is not what happened?

On the way to something of an answer for this, let's have a look at the Gur Aryeh, number 3. The Gur Aryeh (Maharal, a supercommentary on Rashi), here weaves a more complex psychological scenario about this transaction between Moshe and the people. And what he says is this – I'll say it very briefly. The people ask, in Sefer Devarim, to send a reconnaissance mission, a fact-finding mission. Everyone has to agree that that is perfectly acceptable.

But they are not saying what they really want. What is in their hearts is a serious anxiety, לא מאמינים שהיא ארץ טובה, the Gur Aryeh says. They seriously don't believe that it is a good land, and I wonder what that means. What is a good land? What do they think a good land is? What is this anxiety that they are hiding in their hearts and that they are not going to articulate? What they will say is perfectly respectable. And Moshe hears it with the ears of someone who does not have that kind of transactional subtlety, that human beings in general have. To understand that someone can say something and not mean exactly what they say, that doesn't enter into Moshe's world. He takes it to G-d for consultation and G-d says שלח לך, by which Moshe understands that it's not so good, something is wrong here. G-d is not giving me real guidance, he's just letting me do what I want, so there's something wrong here. And at this point he understands what's wrong here; he begins to understand what's going on. And he turns round to the people and he says to them, 'Go ahead, choose spies, send them to find out if it's a good land or a bad land'. Now this is very dramatic. What is happening here? They didn't ask that – they asked for a mission to find out specifications, the roads, the cities. And he ignores what they ask, and he says, 'Alright, go ahead and find out if it's a good land or a bad land'. What does he hope will happen when he has done this?

What he has done, in a sense, has been to pluck from their unconscious, as if he's responding to something they haven't said: 'I know what you really want, I know what is really troubling you, and I'm putting it out there for you. Not only am I saying it like it is, but I am not troubled by it. Fine, go ahead, send the spies, doesn't bother me in the least, find out, since these are your anxieties'. What is he hoping? Says the Gur Aryeh, he is hoping that since they see that he is so understanding and he really knows who they are and what they are, and it doesn't seem to trouble him, and he is ready to test it out, perhaps at that point they will give up their anxiety and they will feel sufficiently calm, and things can continue without the spy project. Unfortunately, again this doesn't work: they insist on sending the spies. And there is something going on here that has to do with 'Is it a good land or a bad land?' that troubles the people so profoundly that in every scenario, say the Maharal, and Rashi, that none of Moshe's attempts to allay their anxiety seems to work.

And with this I want to move into the very unusual suggestion of the Abarbanel. This is a very brief passage from a much longer discussion in the Abarbanel. Moshe's question, 'Is it a good land or a bad land?' - that was Moshe's sin. That was the sin that meant that Moshe did not get to enter Eretz Yisrael. The fact that he asked that question and led the people into trouble. The whole tragedy happened because of this question. The people looked to find out 'Is it a good land or a bad land?' and they

bring back a catastrophic answer. Now we still don't know what the catastrophic answer is. It sounds perfectly respectable at first, but that's what brought down the whole project of Yeziat Mizrayim, in a sense. But he put the question in their minds and he bears responsibility for it. And if they don't get to go into Eretz Yisrael then he doesn't get to go into Eretz Yisrael. In other words, he share responsibility because he planted the question in their minds. Now of course what's so striking about the Abarbanel's idea here, is that first of all, as every school child knows, the reason that Moshe did not get to enter Eretz Yisrael is because of the story of the rock. What I'm trying to do here is explain that there's no such thing as 'knowing'. In Parshat Chukat, Rashi will define the sin of Moshe: He hit the rock instead of speaking to it. Now that knowledge that we all have is a schoolchild's knowledge. As soon as we stop being schoolchildren, we begin to wonder about the connection between this story and the punishment. What is it, in that story, that could justify such a terrible doom befalling Moshe? That the destination of his life, to enter Eretz Canaan, is suddenly cut off from him, and for what? No-one knows really why.

If you look at the mefarshim everyone has a different opinion. If everyone has a different opinion of what the sin was, within that story, then it means that no one knows what it was. Rashi says it was speaking to the rock. Rambam says it was the sin of anger, he spoke angrily to the people, contemptuously in that case, and that was the sin. And other mefarshim will say other things. That means that there is certainly no clear, obvious solution to the question of Moshe's sin, one that would explain why G-d says to him, so startlingly, יען לא האמנתם בי להקדישני לעיני כל ישראל – Because you didn't believe in me, to sanctify me in the eyes of all Israel, לכן לא תביאו את הקהל הזה – therefore you will not bring this people into Eretz Yisrael. The sound of it is very logical. It is the sound of pure logic – because, therefore. But if you listen to the content, what is it? Because he didn't believe in G-d, he didn't sanctify G-d? Where do you see that in the story? And so you have attempt after attempt to try to find a sin to pair with the punishment. But here the Abarbanel goes one step further: Who says it has to be in this story? It could be anywhere in the Torah. Since this story is set next to the punishment, one tends to think that one has to look there, but since it is so clearly unclear, perhaps one has to look elsewhere. And he looks, and in a very finely argued passage he makes a case that Moshe is involved in the sin of the spies. He is the cause, indirectly, of the sin of the spies, and therefore he can't enter Eretz Yisrael.

Now that is a very serious problem. If that is Moshe's sin, then it answers in a sense to the gravity of the punishment. Among the many interesting arguments the Abarbanel makes, I think the most powerful is that it's in the context of Moshe's narrative of the meraglim, in Sefer Devarim. That we read וגם בי התאנף ה' בגללכם – and also against me G-d was angry because of you, and He said to me גם אתה לא תבוא – you too don't get to go into Eretz Yisrael. In other words (it sounds very convincing, just listen to that pasuk), Moshe's doom, the punishment of Moshe is in the same context as the punishment of the people. It has something to do with the meraglim, and it has something to do with not going being able to go into Eretz Yisrael like them. That is the analogy made there. And it is just left to the Abarbanel to try todefine exactly what was his sin within the story of the meraglim. (Aharon doesn't get to enter Eretz Yisrael because of the story of the eigel. Another very interesting explanation. Not the immediate story of the rock, but something else entirely.)

The Abarbanel is suggesting that there could be a long gap between what Moshe does and the punishment that comes much later. And it's a gap that is never clearly bridged. G-d never says to Moshe, in so many words, The reason you don't get to go to Eretz Yisrael is because of your role in the meraglim story. That's left to the reader. That's left to the reader who wants to make sense of the text. The reader is free then to take the widest possible view of the whole of the Torah, to try to find a sin to match the punishment. It's a punishment looking for a sin. Why does G-d hide that connection? Why does G-d not explicitly say 'This connects with that', the Abarbanel asks. And he answers beautifully that it is because Hashem is מאריך אפו – there is this idea of ארך אפים – this idea that G-d is slow to anger; there is a certain patience. What it really means, in the Abarbanel's language, is that when one sins there is afterwards a time gap, between the sin and the punishment.

The good news about that is, of course, that if you're given time, you're given life and hope and possibilities; perhaps you'll change, perhaps you'll rethink the situation, and perhaps the verdict won't happen. So by not specifying clearly right away that this is going to be your punishment there is freedom given to the human being, to Moshe, freedom of movement to perhaps take a different course, and prevent the punishment. That's the good news about ארך אפים. There's life and there's possibility – there's חסד .

But what's the bad news about ארך אפים ? It seems a strange way of asking the question, but I'm interested in good and bad, טוב ורע. What's the bad news about ארך אפים ? I suggest that because of ארך אפים we will never know for sure what connects with what. If it's not immediately after, and if no-one ever comes and makes it clear what the connection is, then, even in reading Torah, we are in the same position that we are in in real life, which is that we act, and apparently G-d doesn't react, we get away with it, and we just go on living

Now I'm quoting the Maor Vashemesh, source 8, a very interesting passage. In the beginning there, he makes a theological comment. He says if there is to be bechira, if there is to be free choice, actually freedom, if there is to be a freedom of movement whereby people can validly do whatever they want to do, then there has to be ארך אפים , there has to be a gap between the sin and the punishment, otherwise there's no freedom. If you are slapped down immediately you do something, then you know for sure it's going to hurt next time, so you don't do it. There's no freedom to put your hand in the fire. Technically you have freedom to do it, but if you know it's going to hurt, you are not going to be free in any real sense to do it.

In raising children, the books advise that if you have to punish – then punish immediately, to make that connection. That is, you are raising your children to make that connection, to know that there is pain associated with certain acts. What we are doing is that we are conditioning children, we are treating children like animals, we are training them to certain kinds of behavior that we think are desirable. But once the children are no longer children, once they grow up, then that is not going to happen anymore. And then what will matter is the inner world of the person. What is it that I think is the right thing to do, and will I be able to live with the consequences of what I'm thinking of doing at this point, even if that slap on the wrist doesn't happen for, perhaps, ever, as far as I may be aware. If there is no direct connection between the slap on the wrist and the act, I will never know for sure what the

connections are. And if something happens out of the blue, some time in our lives, חס ושלום, there is no way, objectively speaking, empirically speaking, we can claim that this is the cause of that – or anyone can claim to me. And when people try to claim these connections, and there are notorious examples of when people speak on the media and explain why a certain tragedy happened, (for instance, because they didn't keep Shabbat) – there's a famous example from a few years ago – there's an almost universal reaction of a kind of disgust. And that bears some thought – why can't you do that? Why can't you make that connection? There's something in us that revolts against making the connection. That is the situation in the real world, in the world we live in.

So if you are looking for meaning; if there are terrible things that happen and you want to understand them, then there is nothing anyone can say to anyone else, and I'm taking a very extreme position, there's nothing anyone can say to anyone else to explain it, to say 'look it must be because you did something bad'. Isn't that what Iyov's friends tried – the helpful friends who came to say, 'If you want to have meaning in the world, if you want to have a logical, orderly world, then you have to believe that you have sinned, otherwise it's a world that defies understanding altogether. It's an unintelligible world'.

So when G-d is מאריך אפו – when G-d doesn't react right away, what He is doing, in a sense, is reducing the impression of order and justice and meaning in the world. That's a very serious act, but it is justified for the sake of bechira, for the sake of the freedom that that gives the individual. There's a certain freedom to come at what I think, what I feel, without the imminent threat of punishment.

I'd like to very briefly have a look at number five, and we're going to do this very superficially because the hour is late, and this is not perhaps the place for this. Number five is about the apparently clear connection between certain stories and the punishment that happened as a result. And Rashi and the Talmud undermine that clarity, they confound that clarity. After the rebellion of Korach. Moshe falls on his face in despair at the rebellion, and he doesn't pray for the people. The question is, What was so terrible about this particular sin that meant that Moshe gave up hope altogether, for the people at this moment? The answer that Rashi gives, is that this is the fourth sin in a series. It started with the eigel, and went on to the mitonnanim, this week it is the mergalim, and next week it is Korach. And Moshe kept davening throughout the first three. When it came to the fourth, he is demoralized, he gives up. The implication is that what makes Moshe despair is not this particular sin, it's the residues of the past. Everything leaves a residue, even if it is invisible. The result is a kind of build-up. By the time you get to the fourth act, the person is no longer in the same place as he was in the first act. Then comes the straw that breaks the camel's back. But this final act is not the sufficient cause of the punishment.

And again: (Five gimmel) Every schoolchild knows that the forty years in the wilderness are the punishment for the meraglim. No, says Rashi, the count begins the year before. This is the second year in the midbar. It begins already with the eigel; the forty years begin back then. Which means that this verdict begins, in the mind of Hashem, with the eigel. And then it is a question of what they will do afterwards. That's ארך אפים – they're given a certain amount of time. They can go either way. But what happens is they continue on a certain course, that in the end becomes the

meraglim, and then Hashem says, Forty years תשאו את עונותיכם – and Rashi comments, You will have to bear your sins, not your sin. It's not a particular sin that brought the forty year punishment. So we have to let go (maybe you already have and I'm banging on an open door) of this notion of a rather mechanical relationship between sin and punishment. You do something particular and this is what happens. Whereas, in fact, what Rashi is stressing over and over again, is that punishment is the response to processes that are underway over perhaps a long period of time, without leaving a mark, without apparently eliciting any kind of response. But there's a residue building up, and in the end reality is changed irrevocably – the straw that breaks the camel's back, the cumulative effect.

Now let's examine that notion in terms of the stories in the Torah. I like to quote a deceptively simple ma'amar chazal, which occurs in the Gemara in Brachot: למד לשונך איני יודעל – Teach your tongue to say, I don't know. I think that's a tongue twister. Very difficult to get round one's tongue sometimes, I don't know… There are certain areas where I don't consider myself expert, so I'm quite happy to say I don't know. But there are certain areas where it really is quite hard to say I don't know. These are things I'm supposed to know, I should know. And perhaps just about those things I should begin to reclaim my ignorance, I should begin to understand that actually the knowledge that I think I have is blocking me rather than helping me. It's schoolchild knowledge. It's knowledge that is preventing me from looking further, from looking again and trying to find a better explanation, trying to find something that would satisfy me more. Wallace Stevens, the American poet, writes of the need 'to see again with an ignorant eye.' He could have used a more pleasant word, he could have said to look with an innocent eye, then we could all have accepted that without a quibble. It's very nice to see with an innocent eye. But he uses the word ignorant; it's not pleasant, who wants to be ignorant. And that is a kind of mussar point that he is making. The reader is being provoked out of a kind of knowingness.

This sense of ignorance is a good thing. Consciousness of ignorance is a good thing. Which leads me into the most difficult of material. And again, I try to be as brief as possible. I think the most difficult material has to do with the relationship between the terrible things that happen in the real world, and any kind of meaning. Any kind of explanation for why they happen.

And so if you have a look at source number nine in front of you. The first one for instance, without preamble. אמרו מלאכי השרת לפני הקב"ה: רבונו של עולם מפני מה כנסת מתה על אדם הראשון – The angels asked G-d, Master of the world, why did you punish man with death? The question is put in a language of punishment. In an orderly world there is a punishment where there is a crime, a sin. And so Hashem answers, I gave him one easy command, one easy mitzvah, and he failed, he didn't do it. But the angels are persistent and they try again. They say, What about Moshe and Aharon who kept the whole Torah, they didn't fail in anything, why did they have to die? What could Hashem's answer have been, to maintain an orderly and meaningful world? A true answer in fact could have been they did sin, who says they didn't sin? But that's not the answer that Hashem gives. What does He reply – he quotes Kohelet as it were, מקרה אחד לצדיק ולרשע – the same things happen to the righteous person and to the wicked.

Now that's a very difficult pasuk in Kohelet. In the next source there is the whole pasuk: the same fate befalls everybody – righteous and wicked, good, pure, and impure - מקרה – as if by chance – now this is not to be taught to schoolchildren.. What interests me is that this is obvious empirically, and you don't have live long to know it - that the same things happen to everybody. There is no way to distinguish between groups of people in terms of their fate and to interpret that as a diagnosis of their moral status, their moral or spiritual status. There is no such correlation. Now we are used to that idea. I assume that everyone here is used to that idea and struggles with it in one sense or another. Chazal talk about it as if it is a terrible revelation. It is something that troubles them to the depths of their being, and they say it as extremely as possible. That is, if you are troubled by it, chazal are even more troubled by it, and that makes them very extreme in their way of putting it. They don't compromise, they don't soften the point. They actually say it more harshly than perhaps we would say it.

Let's look at a couple of examples of the midrash on that pasuk. Number nine gimmel. Who is the righteous person? That's Noah, he's called tzaddik. And there's a midrash that tells that when he came out of the teivah he was limping because he was late feeding a lion one day, and the lion swiped his leg and broke it. That's the midrash. Then there's another story, no connection, about Pharaoh Harasha. Here's the comparison between a tzaddik and a rasha. Now Pharaoh also had, in a different set of circumstances, I won't go into the details, but he had a similar experience, a lion broke his leg, and the result is, where does the story end? זה מת צולע וזה מת צולע – this one died limping and that one died limping. I can't tell you how surprised I am by this kind of logic, by this way of analyzing reality. Surely there are other ways of commenting on the world, rather than focusing on a sub-group of people who die limping!

Actually what chazal are doing here, in a sense, they are parodying a certain empirical way of looking at things,int which you choose something to explore, a certain research project, some phenomenon, like people who die limping. And you want to find out if there is any correlation between that group and any other statement one could make, in terms of physical health, spiritual health, emotional health. All research projects, in a sense, work on this kind of logic. And what chazal are saying is if we are fully empirical about this and we try to find out what difference does it make if a person is a tzaddik or a rasha in this world, and we choose the most minor and very precise instrument to work with, we are going to find that there is no correlation at all – צדיק רשע מקרה אחד. And then they go on, in the second part of this particular midrash. The 'tov' the person who is good is Moshe, the pure is Aharon, and those who are impure are the meraglim. The meraglim slander the land, and Moshe and Aharon spoke good about the land, So they are opposites in their behaviour. And what happened? These don't get to go into the land, and these don't get to go into the land. Now, in a way that is less strange – it's pointing specifically to the fact that the same doom is visited on people who have very opposite attitudes to Eretz Yisrael.

If we now look at the next passage, nine dalet. This one no longer relates to that pasuk, but rather to one from Iyov, and of course Iyov is the place for questions like this אף לא זז יחרד לבי וישתר למקומה – 'Even at this my heart shudders and jolts out of place.' That is Iyov's reaction to a shocking phenomenon of nature which makes him

shudder internally. And chazal pick that pasuk to say that's not what really makes us shudder. What really makes us shudder is not the terrors of nature, but the questions. This sense of the incomprehensibility of the world, the inscrutability of G-d's meaning. How one can't read, with any ease at all, G-d's meaning in the world. That's what makes one shudder. And the midrash goes on to give an example: Shouldn't the children of Aharon be treated as well as his stick? What a strange comparison? Comparing his children to his stick. Remember the staff in next week's parsha – it went into the mishkan dry and dead and came out a flowering almond branch, to prove that Aharon was the true cohen. Look what happened to his stick and look what happened to his children. They went in alive and came out dead. Now that already again is not the most obvious way you would put the question. It's a bizarre, dislocated way of looking at the question. Comparing people with a stick. Somehow it seems to me that chazal are here pushing hard at all our normal ways of framing questions. Looking for logic, looking for meanings, comparing this and that and coming up with nothing. At the end what do you come up with? A shudder in the heart…

And in the last part, at the end of the midrash, the comparison, again, is a bit more acceptable in a sense. Titus Harasha, he went into the kodesh hakodeshim with arrogance and cruelty, with a sword in his hand he dragged aside the parochet. He violated the sanctity of the kodesh hakodeshim with a harlot. And he came out with a sword dripping with blood, נכנס בשלום ויצא בשלום. Absolutely unscathed, nothing happened to him at all, whereas bnei Aharon went into the holy space להקריב – seeking intimacy with G-d - and came out burned..

How can we understand a world like that? And Chazal are not offering any answers. They are not going on to say 'ah yes, but, here's a way of understanding the incomprehensible'. Instead they just present us, I think incomparably, with the questions that everyone has had. And in some sense they press them further. To the point, I would almost say, that they make us realize that perhaps we should be looking elsewhere for a language about suffering, for a language about the nature of the world. Perhaps we shouldn't be looking for order, for explanations of this kind, of this objective kind. Explanations that would satisfy everybody, that you could give a shiur about, give a lecture about, and then people would nod and say, 'Now I see it'. That's the wrong theater, somehow that's the wrong place to be.

What's the right place to be? I don't know if I have an answer to that, so perhaps I shouldn't have asked the question! What could the right place be? Where one could come to see differently? What world of language would one need to develop?

But let me press on now back to the spies. All this in a sense has been a way of bringing us back to the story of the spies, perhaps with a different perspective. The question is, Is it a good land or a bad land? For Moshe there is only one answer. He looks at the world, say chazal, in a different way to the way any other human being looks at the world. Now that's a very strong claim. Moshe is unique in his perspective on the world. If you want to understand something about how people look at the world, then you have to understand that it is the opposite of the way Moshe looks at the world. How does Moshe look at the world? This is the one distinction that chazal are willing to make between Moshe and other people. He looks at the

world (Gemara Yebamot 49) באספקלריא מאירה through a clear glass, while everyone else looks at the world through an unclear glass, non-radiant glass.

I don't know what that means - I got myself to say the words איני יוד And if you ask ten people what it means, my guess is that you will get ten different theories. Let me just suggest this. It seems to me perhaps that when Moshe hears the word טוב, for him it means something unequivocal, objective, something that you only have to look and you will see it, it's out there. He sees without distortion. Our way of looking, that of every human being, is not objective, that's the first thing to say about it. It can't be objective. Objectivity is an illusion and sometimes an illusion in bad faith. I can't claim to be objective about important issues, especially not about the question of טוב או רע – good or bad. There is no objective answer to that question; there is only my subjective response which is the fruit of everything that I am, that my parents are, my society, and my fantasies. Everything that is built up inside me, means that I will have a response. Now I'd like to translate טוב ורע rather crudely here; to mean: I like it or I don't like it. I'm attracted to it, I love it, or I recoil from it, I hate it.

Moshe thinks it's a very simple matter. You have to go and look and you will come back with the right answer. The people see with אספקלריא לא מאירה – but they come back trying to be Moshe, trying to see with the eye of G-d. So they say it is a good land, a land flowing with milk and honey, they quote all the right sources, and they bring the objective proof, as if טוב ורע are issues of objectivity. Now the Rambam already speaks of this in his Introduction to Moreh Nevuchim. When Adam and Chava ate the fruit from the עץ הדעת טוב ורע, what they introduced into the world for the first time, was טוב ורע. Before that there had only been something like emet vesheker. Emet and sheker (true and false) is a very different criterion from good and evil. Adam and Chava are set to perform, true to their essential selves, without love or hate, without free choice. Ramban also says what comes into their experience as soon as they eat of that fruit, is that complicated world of ahava and sina'ah, love and hatred, and a whole range of subjective feelings which means that free willed choice begins. How can you choose between something objectively good and objectively evil? There's no choice. Personal feeling, personal perspective, means that one tastes freedom for the first time. And suddenly there's the possibility of choice.

Similarly, in our narrative: that אספקלריא מאירה that clarity of vision of Moshe, represents a unique intimation of the Garden of Eden status of consciousness, but set now in a world of post-Eden consciousness, where 'Good and Bad' have taken on hues of rich complexity. There's a very beautiful passage in Emerson's essay on Nature. I won't read the passage, because the hour is late. But he describes the experience of living in the wonderful New World, the promised land that is America, in the nineteenth century. Of an evening walk that turns rapturous:

*Crossing a bare common, in snow puddles, at twilight, under a clouded sky, without having in my thoughts any occurrence of special good fortune, I have enjoyed a perfect exhilaration. I am glad to the brink of fear. In the woods, too, a man casts off his years, as the snake his slough, and at what period soever of life is always a child. In the woods is perpetual youth…In the woods, we return to reason and faith. There I feel that nothing can befall me in life, - no disgrace, no calamity (leaving me my eyes), which nature cannot repair. Standing on the bare ground, - my head bathed by*

*the blithe air and uplifted into infinite space, - all mean egotism vanishes. I become a transparent eyeball; I am nothing; I see all; the currents of the Universal Being circulate through me; I am part or parcel of God.*

Suddenly he is transfigured, his subjective complexities drop away from him. 'I become a transparent eyeball.' Now that's a translation of אספקלריא. Cartoonists had a wonderful time with this image: apparently there are cartoons with eyeballs running round on spindly legs. I feel an uneasiness about this passage in all its beauty, and this is an uneasiness that is shared by the critic, Mark Edmundson: perhaps this clearsighted rapture is achieved all too effortlessly, against no perceptible opposition? Emerson has not conveyed sufficiently 'his antagonist,' that is, the real possibility of irreparable harm, real loss, real grief. 'Nothing can befall me in life… which nature cannot repair.' His exaltation, his sense of a renewed self have an edge of bravado: has he overcome death, or merely sheltered himelf from it?

What report did the spies bring? 'It's a good land, a perfectly good land, flowing with milk and honey.' That's the objectively right answer. But it takes two seconds and then all the bile comes spilling out. 'Efes' - 'but that's irrelevant. Everything I just said, all that objective praise of the land, it sounds so powerful, it's absolutely powerless. Objective descriptions of this kind don't meet the issue. 'Efes. Efes ki az ha'am' the people are too strong for us….' There follows the description of the giants, over and over again – we saw the giants, we saw the giants. Really it's a hallucination of giants. They are filled with fantasies of giants. And at the end they say, ארץ אוכל את יושביה it's a land that eats up its inhabitants. Now that's not an objective description, it's fantasy, some kind of primal horror, projecting on the land some very deep fear. Or perhaps there is a slight objective element. What do chazal say? That wherever they went in the land they saw funerals; G-d made this happen to distract the inhabitants from the spies, so that they should not pay attention to them. However, looking at it from the point of view of the spies, subjectively the land becomes a land of horror, a mother who consumes her young. That is what emerges from them, almost unwittingly. Their conscious answer has been a perfectly good one, but the real things that are going on in them, the real answer to the question, 'Is it good or bad?' comes out of them in an uncontrollable way, and in the end blocks them from being able to move. They can't move towards Eretz Yisrael, such is the power of the subjective world, which expresses itself almost against their conscious intent. There has been no attempt to integrate in any way the different dimensions of their inner world.

Perhaps it would have been better had they come back and brought honest report. An honest report being a subjective report. Now I know I'm saying the opposite of what people generally say, and I'm very aware of that. What people generally say is that the spies sinned in editorializing, in expressing their personal fears and opinions: they were just asked to bring back objective description. And I'm suggesting the opposite, I'm saying that when you ask the question, 'Is it good or is it bad?' then that claims a subjective response. To pretend that this is an objective question is a kind of defense, it means that you don't have to deal with what you really think about it. What are the complexities at play here? Ignored, those subjective responses have great power, and in the end the people are defenseless against their own terror.

What do the good spies, Calev and Yehoshua, answer? It is striking that their report seems almost identical with that of the other spies. They say ,אם חפץ בנו ה - if G-d desires us, if G-d likes us – suddenly completely non-objective language. A question of liking, loving, desiring, a new vocabulary. We've never heard this word before between Hashem and Yisrael. If Hashem desires us then the land is טובה מאד מאד - it's a very very good land. What is the effect of מאד מאד?. In English, 'very' paradoxically weakens one's statement – a good strong adjective is far more powerful. . In Hebrew, maybe it is slightly different. But what is מאד מאד? It's almost a sense that they are struggling for language. And these are the good spies, Calev and Yehoshua. And they can't find words to describe their experience. So they just say with this kind of intensity, this kind of baffled intensity, they say טובה מאד מאד .

There's a comment of the HeAmek Davar I want to bring into play here. He reminds us of the other טוב מאד, and that was of course Hashem's evaluation of the world, at the end of Creation. He made the world in six days, וירא אלוקים את כל אשר עשה והנה טוב מאד. He looked at everything He had made, including Adam, and said טוב מאד, - 'Very good!' whereas before, every day, it had been - 'Good!' - טוב. What is טוב מאד? There is a midrash, which I have always found difficult. (Midrash Rabba) טוב מאד זה מלאך המות. – '"Very good" is the Angel of Death.' The HeAmek Davar says: This uninvited visitor, this unwelcome visitor which is death, the effect of it is to make us love even more intensely. We love what we love even more intensely – it is **very** good - because we know that there are limits; that there are griefs and losses built into the nature of reality. We can't explain them, logic doesn't help us, but we can't help noticing the intensity with which we love as a result. Our feelings about life have an edge to them precisely because of the fact of death. And that applies also, the HeAmek Davar says, to Eretz Yisrael. That is, the fact that there is so much tragedy in Eretz Yisrael can mean that not only do we not love it less, but sometimes it means that we love it more. Or it can mean the opposite. It can mean that we hate it and get up and leave. That also is a response. But those who are here, those who stay, are not here in spite of it, but in some sense because of it. In some sense it gives them a feeling of intensity, of a certain personal power of desire, that perhaps would not be as intense if there weren't this natural or unnatural phenomenon that's called death.

The relationship between what one loves and theantangonist –the terrible things that happen – is not as simple and objective and empirical as all that. If a Martian were to come to earth, perhaps he wouldn't understand why it is that people respond so illogically to situations. A situation with a lot of death is a hateful situation and one should get away from it. And that is true, in every obvious sense. And yet there are these complicated and very human responses in which good strangely is intertwined with evil. And what results then is a complexity in the constitution of אהבה – love.

Now that notion טובה מאד מאד, the idea of an intensity of experience leads me to my last point. Which is that a new vocabulary begins here. The old vocabulary, the objective vocabulary, the one the spies were telling themselves would do, failed completely. And what begins now is a vocabulary of subjectivity, desire, love, hate.

When is the word hate used to describe the relations between Hashem and Bnei Yisrael? It's a pasuk that no-one seems to know. And for me it's an essential pasuk to describe the story of the meraglim. At the end of the forty years, in that same

speech, Moshe says to the people, ולא אביתם לעלת – you didn't want to go up. Not that you were afraid. Fear was part of it, but the point was you had no desire, you did not want to go up. And on that disastrous night, the night of the crying, 'you grumbled in your tents, and you said it's because G-d hates us that He took us out of Mizrayim to kill us here.' (Deut. 1:27) The whole Exodus narrative was not a love story, but a hate story. That is really what was going on in their minds, perhaps in their unconscious minds. They never hinted that in any explicit way, but this is Moshe's diagnosis. Moshe says this is what was really going on. There was a sense of being unloved by G-d. Stronger than that: שנאת ה אותנו.

And I ask what would make a person feel that way? Perhaps, Sforno suggests, because they sinned with idol worship in Mitzrayim, and so they felt when G-d took them out of Egypt, redemption was only a pretence, and it really was a malicious story, a long, winding malicious story which in the end would massacre them at the border of Eretz Yisrael. Gods have been known in mythology to behave like that, and somewhere there is a terror in the human heart about the power of the gods, about human powerlessness. This is not a good story. Even more stunning is Rashi's comment: Moshe says to the people, 'Really G-d loves you but' - it's hard to say this - 'you hated Him' אתם שנאים אותו. This is projection. The people speak of being hated by God, projecting on Him their own hatred. (Rashi describes the dynamic: When you have in your heart a feeling about another person, and you say they feel that way about you.)

So what do we have? Rashi's psychological understanding of the moment of the meraglim brings to a climax his narrative of good and bad as deeply inward, projective experiences. It wasn't fear, or lack of faith, that constituted their sin. Most radically, he diagnoses a deep antagonism within the people towards G-d. Something destructive within the people meant that they couldn't tolerate a life with G-d, so that they misinterpreted everything to fit a certain fantasy, a malevolent fantasy. That's an unequivocal and striking interpretation. I would like to make just one comment about this. D.W.Winnicott, the great British psychoanalyst, writes of hate and love as the two strong and omnipresent elements within the life of every human being. From the beginning, the infant's love of the mother - and it is great love - is interwoven with aggressiveness. That kind of primitive loving impulse eventually becomes more civilized. The child grows to realize that the mother is a separate person. The project then is how to integrate the loving and the hating impulses a very specific sense, to. No human being, from this point of view, is without these impulses. If one were, one would probably live a very tame life. One's idea of love would be a tame and uncreative thing.

The problem is integration. If one doesn't recognize one's hate, the negative side of oneself, then one can't really act out one's love. If one isn't willing to give the hate a voice, hear what it is saying, then the love, too, remains unexpressed. And indeed we notice - and for me this is very meaningful - as soon as Moshe diagnoses the hatred of people at the beginning of Sefer Devarim, what follows is many records of love. The first records of love that you ever have in the Torah between Hashem and the people. Hashem loves you, and you (should) love Him. As soon as Moshe feels that the people are ready to hear him diagnose their condition – that is, when they have grown enough (they are a different generation, there has been a certain maturing, and they are willing to recognize their own שנאה) – the wellsprings of love are released.

The element of hatred in the people's sense of G-d, of the Land, of themselves, is expressed, elsewhere, too, we begin to notice: מאסתם את ה' – it's there in last week's parsha, and in this week's parsha: מאסתם את הארץ – it modulates into a hatred of the land.

Unwilling to recognize their own hostilities, the spies have recourse to pseudo-objective criteria – it's a good land, the fruit. They present themselves as living in a world of objective meanings. But Moshe congratulates the people at the end of the forty years for being able to hear his radical diagnosis. Now, they are capable of integrating these impulses and genuinely loving G-d.

Now the very end of the story, you can see in Rashi - in a sense this is all Rashi's story, about the nature of טוב ורע and the nature of love and hate. But first, look at source 13, the Abarbanel again. Moshe, in his one plea to G-d to enter Eretz Yisrael, to overcome that gezeira, what is he really looking for? The Abarbanel says, he is not looking for personal pleasure, he is looking לאמת את דבריו, and he pleads, 'Please let me cross over the Jordan with the people and see את הארץ הטובה הזאת- to see this **good** land. Let me look at this land together with the people, and then I can turn to them and say, You see I was right.' I would add that he is still thinking in terms of אמת ושקר – of true and false. He still informed by that אספקלריה מאירה which means he doesn't understand that that is not relevant to the people. That is not how the people function, by objective truth. And Hashem stops him and says, Enough, stop talking to Me about this thing (Deut. 3:26), stop this obsessive concern with this issue of טוב ורע, and objective criteria that can be empirically demonstrated.

On the other hand, when does Moshe get the illumination? At the end of the story, - the last Rashi on your page. Right at the end before he dies – this is Rashi's story, I'm not really adding to it - he says to the people ולא נתן ה' לכם לב לדעת ועינים לראות ואזנים לשמוע עד היום הזה – 'Hashem didn't give you a heart to know and eyes to see and ears to hear until this day'(Deut. 29:3) - which is a rather double-edged compliment. In a way he is saying, Today you are fully sentient, you are full human beings with all your faculties, but up to now you weren't. How is this? And Rashi explains, a wonderful Rashi, on that day Moshe had handed the Torah to the people of his tribe, to the Levites. And the people are up in arms as usual, they come and they grumble, and there is that aggressive tone in their voice again: 'But G-d gave it to us, it's our Torah, why are you making it exclusive to your tribe?' And when Moshe hears this, for the first time he is happy at the aggressiveness in their voice. He is happy because he can hear the real voice of desire, the real voice of 'I **want** the Torah'. Not being dragged by the heels, but wanting, desiring, loving. In Rashi's words, Moshe says to the people now I understand that you really have עתה הבנתי שאתם חפצים ודבקים בהקב"ה – a desire to

'Now I understand that you desire and cling passionately to God – this day you have become a people.' He rejoices at the evidence that the people are revived to a very different relation to the question of good and evil, love and hate – different from his own perspective, and matured from their earlier evasions of inner truth.

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That's what I wanted to say about the parsha and I just wanted to add one more word about Joy, who has been in my mind all through. What I want to say is that many things of course have been said, and will go on being said, about Joy because she was an extraordinary person. And one has a sense of a kind of coherent narrative about Joy. She was intelligent, she was learned, she had a wonderful sense of humor, she was very communicative; she was someone who wanted to know and to be known. She wasn't a shrinking lily – she was out there, she was running around all over Poland, great mesirat nefesh, in a public vein. Once, she winced when she opened the door, and I asked her what's wrong, and she said 'I sprained my shoulder in Poland carrying all these heavy bags', - making nothing of it. And suddenly I realized what going to Poland meant. She wasn't just going to Warsaw and sitting among the people she knew, she was travelling around all over Poland in primitive conditions, communicative, trying to find ways of talking to people, to be affected by them and affect them. She was really out there.

Look at how she danced at her wedding, I can never forget that. That is the Joy, parts of whom different people among us know. We all know different parts of the Joy out there. But the part of Joy that moved me especially, and I loved Joy very much, is the Joy that is still somehow unknown, the Joy that no-one really knew, and I can't say I knew, but I sense it very much. The part that didn't communicate, and there was something silent there - with all the talking that she liked to talk there was something silent there - and she worked very hard in that silence, and it wasn't easy for her.

She didn't have an easy life. That, perhaps people don't know. Nobody has an easy life, that's also possible. And she struggled. She struggled mostly I think on the issue of love. In order to become more and more someone who can love, who can love G-d, who can love Eretz Yisrael, and who can love other people in a full way. And that didn't necessarily entirely come naturally. A lot of it was natural, but she worked very hard at it. So that when I think of Joy I have two visual images. I don't so much remember all the things we talked about - I have to say she talked a lot - I listened a lot! which was a pleasure in itself. But what I do remember very powerfully are two things. One is the image of Joy walking through the streets of Jerusalem alone and silent. And when we would pass her in the car, she would be deep in her thoughts, and I would see this inward face of hers. I would see her face, but not her communicating face, and that's a different face. And I had a feeling of someone who is working very hard, struggling with things and trying to achieve something.

The other image is that of Joy's back, not her face at all. And that was in shul, the beit knesset, during the yamim noraim. She would usually come to the place where I daven. She would sit in the front row, but she would not sit much, she would stand at every opportunity. Wherever there was any suggestion that she should be standing, she would stand. And she would stand absolutely still, without moving a muscle. She would never turn her head, look around. There was an absolute sense of concentration and something very impressive about her back, something totally focussed and non-communicative. She was not in any way social, she wasn't being social at all, but totally focussed. Often I would look at her back. I *was* looking around, and often I would look at her back and try to imagine who is she, try to understand something about her.

These are the memories of Joy that I have, that for me say something about her, something of her godliness, perhaps even more in her silence, and her non-communicating and her isolation. In her presence as a singular person, rather than in all the many wonderful and fruitful ways that she interacted with people.